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GETTING OUT OF THE FUNK: HOW
WISCONSIN COURTS CAN PROTECT
AGAINST THE THREAT TO IMPARTIAL
JURY TRIALS
This Comment critically examines the development of Wisconsin’s
juror bias case law and the challenges that this body of law has created for
judges and practitioners across the State of Wisconsin. Further, this
Comment analyzes whether attempts by the Wisconsin Supreme Court to
clear up the body of juror bias law have been successful or, as this
Comment suggests, have left juror bias law grappling with the same set of
issues. Wisconsin has long recognized the crucial role of the jury to its
legal system and to ensuring the just administration of its laws. To
preserve the integrity of the jury system, Wisconsin courts should grant
broad deference to trial court judges in resolving issues of jury bias.
When determining whether a juror is capable of impartiality, the trial
court has the benefit of invaluable information gathered from face-to-face
observations of the jurors that is not available to appellate courts or
adequately noted in the trial record. This Comment suggests that
appellate courts in Wisconsin, which lack access to trial court judges’
direct observations of juror bias, should consult the trial court judges,
rather than relying solely on the trial record, regarding their findings on
juror bias before deciding whether to uphold the trial judges’ decisions on
appeal.
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INTRODUCTION
1

Recent discourse in the Wisconsin Supreme Court in State v. Funk
illustrates that current juror bias jurisprudence remains in a state of flux.
2
The case, having three dissenting opinions, demonstrates that current
juror bias standards can produce controversial results, which pose a
threat to the legitimacy of Wisconsin trials involving issues of juror bias
or jurors concealing information. As noted in the past, confusing labels
3
and inoperable standards have hindered the State of Wisconsin’s
4
pursuit of that prized “instrument of justice,” an impartial jury, which is
5
6
guaranteed both by its constitution and the Constitution of our nation.
To ensure that this prize is not forfeited, Wisconsin should consider both
the fundamental principles that are served by voir dire, as well as how
those principles can be practically administered by Wisconsin citizens
7
and lawyers.
While pondering the future of Wisconsin’s juror bias jurisprudence,
one must consider the obstacles facing jury selection—such as time
constraints, maintaining judicial integrity, and the inability of some
jurors to be impartial or aware of their prejudices—to ensure the
ultimate success of the jury in serving its role as “the lamp that shows
8
that freedom lives.” Acknowledging that a completely impartial jury is
1. State v. Funk, 2011 WI 62, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421.
2. See id. ¶ 65 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting); see id. ¶ 80 (Bradley, J., dissenting); see id.
¶ 122 (Prosser, J., dissenting).
3. See Sarvenaz J. Raissi, Comment, Analyzing Juror Bias Exhibited During Voir Dire in
Wisconsin: How to Lessen the Confusion, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 517, 521 (2000).
4. PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 164 (3d ed. 1966).
5. WIS. CONST. art. I, §§ 5, 7; see State v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 715, 596 N.W.2d 770,
777 (1999).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
7. Mary R. Rose & Shari Seidman Diamond, Judging Bias: Juror Confidence and
Judicial Rulings on Challenges for Cause, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513, 515 (2008) (“Jury
selection procedures vary, but a significant part of voir dire is aimed at establishing whether a
juror’s background or attitudes raise any ‘red flags’ about that person’s ability to keep an
open mind during the trial.” (internal citation omitted)); see Christopher A. Cosper,
Rehabilitation of the Juror Rehabilitation Doctrine, 37 GA. L. REV. 1471, 1475 (2003) (“The
purpose of [voir dire] is to locate and remove any members of the venire who are biased,
thereby fulfilling the constitutional commitment to provide for an impartial jury.”); see also
VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 68 (1986) (discussing the
importance of jury selection in allowing attorneys to meet the jury for the first time,
strategically introduce facts, build rapport with the jury, and inform jurors on legal principles
important to the case).
8. DEVLIN, supra note 4, at 164.
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unattainable, the jury is designed so that each juror will “enrich and
correct the others’ perceptions in ways that will lead to a common or at
least integrated understanding that might not have been available to
9
them individually.” Voir dire serves as a tool to eliminate those
perceptions that are most likely formed from “conscious or
10
subconscious preconceptions and biases,” and its effectiveness is
dependent upon the candor of jurors, the competency of trial lawyers,
11
and the instincts of trial judges in evaluating juror bias challenges.
Therefore, to promote the integrity of jury trials in Wisconsin,
adaptations should be made to promote juror candor and effective
questioning methods by counsel, and special deference should be given
to the experience and observations of trial court judges in making
12
determinations on juror bias. I will begin outlining these potential
changes, after first describing, in Part II of this Comment, Wisconsin’s
13
attempt to clarify its juror bias jurisprudence in State v. Faucher and its
surrounding era. I will then discuss the effect of a more recent case,
14
State v. Funk, in Part III. Part IV will analyze appellate decisions
subsequent to Faucher. After discussing the existing relevant case law in
Parts II through IV, I will suggest the ways that Wisconsin can improve
in handling situations of juror bias.
In Part V, I will address the need for trial judges to cautiously
exercise discretion, guided by the ultimate goal of impartiality and
avoiding liberal juror rehabilitation methods or other cost-saving
measures that threaten constitutional rights. Part VI will propose the
Transamerica rule, which requires strong deference to the trial court
judge’s determinations on whether a juror is fit to serve on the jury,
ensures that defendants are properly afforded due process of law, avoids
the negative impact on legitimacy that an appellate reversal can bring,

9. See DEVLIN, supra note 4, at 149; JOHN KLEINIG, ETHICS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
AN INTRODUCTION 187 (2008) (explaining that the “deliberative ideal” is often unattainable,
due to improper influences).
10. COMM. ON JURY STANDARDS, ABA JUDICIAL ADMIN. DIV., STANDARDS
RELATING TO JUROR USE AND MANAGEMENT 59 (1993).
11. See State v. Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d 270, 279–80, 588 N.W.2d 1, 5 (1999).
12. See infra Parts V–VII; see also Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d at 279–80, 588 N.W.2d at 5
(“The effectiveness of voir dire depends upon the thorough and well-reasoned questions
posed by counsel and the circuit court, as well as the accuracy and completeness of the
answers provided by prospective jurors.”).
13. State v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 596 N.W.2d 770 (1999).
14. State v. Funk, 2011 WI 62, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421.
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and allows trial judges who have had face-to-face contact with particular
jurors to make the credibility determinations rather than leaving this
15
task to appellate judges reading from the record. Also in Part VI, I will
demonstrate that while practicing attorneys must exercise care during
voir dire, Wisconsin courts should be reluctant to place extreme burdens
16
The remainder of this
of specificity in questioning on counsel.
Comment will further examine each of these topics, after first outlining
the development and current state of juror bias jurisprudence.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF WISCONSIN JUROR BIAS JURISPRUDENCE
Wisconsin has placed a strong emphasis on the effectiveness of its
jury systems and has promoted reforms and improvements to its jury
17
systems for a number of years. Additionally, Wisconsin has recognized
the crucial role that jurors play in our justice system and in 2008, dubbed
18
the month of September “juror appreciation month.”
Despite its
progressive tradition, Wisconsin judges have still struggled to perfect the
19
way they deal with issues of juror bias, particularly during voir dire.

15. See Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Dep’t of ILHR, 54 Wis. 2d 272, 282–83, 195 N.W.2d 656,
662–63 (1972) (explaining that the court has repeatedly held that it is a denial of due process
if an administrative agency overturns a finding of a hearing officer on a matter of credibility,
without having access to the officer's impressions of the witnesses upon which the
determinations were made).
16. See State v. Perry, 136 Wis. 2d 92, 99–100, 401 N.W.2d 748, 751–52 (1987) (explaining
that a new trial may be required where the transcript is so insufficient as to prevent any
meaningful appeal); see, e.g., Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d at 279–80, 588 N.W.2d at 5 (explaining the
purpose of voir dire is to protect against potential bias, and that this is dependent upon
effective questioning by counsel and the court, as well as the accuracy of the juror’s
participation in the process); State v. Harris, 212 Wis. 2d 241, 568 N.W.2d 784 (Ct. App. 1997)
(demonstrating that the Perry rule is inapplicable where the record is insufficient due to a
failure of counsel to make a request for voir dire or opening or closing arguments to be
recorded); WIS. SUP. CT. R. 71.01 (2013); JEFFREY T. FREDERICK, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
THE AMERICAN JURY 124 (1987) (elaborating on the importance of interpersonal skills in
interviewing jurors and effectively achieving their cooperation).
17. See JAMES D. MILLER, JURY REFORM IN WISCONSIN: WHERE WE HAVE BEEN,
WHERE WE ARE NOW, AND WHERE WE ARE GOING 5 (2006).
18. Wisconsin Launches Juror Appreciation Program, WIS. CT. SYS. (Sep. 4, 2008),
http://wicourts.gov/news/view.jsp?id=88; see OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, A PROCLAMATION
(proclaiming the month of September as Juror Appreciation Month). Local courts have also
taken their own efforts to promote the juror appreciation program, including special prizes
and gifts to jurors. See Juror Appreciation Program, WIS. CT. SYS., http://www.wicourts.gov/s
ervices/juror/appreciation.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2013).
19. See State v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 705–06, 596 N.W.2d 770, 773 (1999); Raissi,
supra note 3, at 539 (“The Wisconsin Supreme Court has struggled over the past decade to
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Before discussing how the voir dire process can be improved, it is
necessary to have a sense of the existing body of case law.
A. State v. Faucher
Before the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided State v. Faucher in
20
21
1999, juror bias jurisprudence contained a myriad of confusing labels.
In light of this confusion, the Faucher court noted:
From these cases we have come to recognize that our past
decisions in this area of the law have to a degree lacked the
clarity necessary to properly guide the bench and bar in the
appropriate examination of prospective jurors for evidence of
bias. We believe that the resulting confusion stems from our
inconsistent, and at times imprecise, use of the terms “implied,”
“actual,” and “inferred” to describe a juror’s bias. Today, we no
longer refer to juror bias in these terms; their usefulness has run
22
full course.
Thus, the court instituted new terminology to help relieve the
confusion in applying the previous standards; under the new
terminology, Wisconsin recognizes three types of juror bias: statutory,
23
subjective, and objective.
Statutory bias is simply a conclusive
presumption of bias for anyone “related by ‘blood or marriage to any
party or to any attorney appearing in [the] case’ and those who ‘[have]
24
any financial interest in the case.’” The meanings of the remaining two
concepts are less straightforward and intuitive.
Courts intended subject bias to mean the bias revealed by a
25
prospective juror’s “state of mind” on voir dire. However, as the court
noted, this type of assessment is often incapable of being shown directly,
and thus turns on the juror’s demeanor, answers during voir dire,
26
The court in
truthfulness, credibility, and other pertinent factors.

define bias and determine when to properly overturn circuit court decisions judging juror
bias.”).
20. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 596 N.W.2d 770.
21. See Raissi, supra note 3, at 517–25 (providing an overview of juror bias case law prior
to the Faucher decision).
22. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 705–06, 596 N.W.2d at 773.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 717, 596 N.W.2d at 778.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 717–18, 596 N.W.2d at 778.
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Faucher seemingly granted broad discretion to the trial court’s
assessment of subjective bias, stating that it “believe[s] that the circuit
court sits in a superior position to assess the demeanor and disposition
27
of prospective jurors.” In contrast to the Faucher decision, the court’s
decision in Funk over a decade later placed severe limitations upon the
trial courts’ ultimate authority to remove a juror it believes to be biased
or to order a new trial when a juror is found to have concealed a bias
28
during voir dire.
In contrast to subjective bias, objective bias has a broader focus.
While still considering the individual juror’s responses, the objective
bias inquiry must also consider the “facts and circumstances surrounding
29
the voir dire and the facts involved in the case.” The focus of the
inquiry is whether a reasonable juror, taking into account all of the
30
surrounding circumstances, would be capable of being impartial.
Because the objective bias determination poses a mixed question of fact
and law, appellate courts must give deference to the trial courts’ findings
“regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding voir dire and [these
31
findings] will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous.” However,
whether those facts meet the necessary legal standard is a question of
law open to de novo review by appellate courts and facts not necessarily
apparent from the record, such as observations of a juror’s demeanor,
32
may be afforded due deference. As this Comment will demonstrate,
such a standard of review highlights a significant departure of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court from its tradition of affording broad

27. Id. at 718, 596 N.W.2d at 778.
28. Compare id. (illustrating that despite this particular court’s error in failing to remove
juror Kaiser, a trial court’s determination will generally serve as adequate protection for a
defendant’s right to an impartial jury and thus will be granted deference so long as it is not
clearly erroneous), with State v. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶ 48, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421
(demonstrating a seemingly higher burden on the court to earn deference as the trial court’s
assessment in finding bias was not fully articulated in the record).
In addition, in Faucher, the court overruled the trial court’s finding of no objective bias,
because the juror had expressly stated a bias towards a witness. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 732,
596 N.W.2d at 784–85. In contrast, in Funk, the court overruled the trial court based on what
was not present in the record, making the trial judge’s assessment of greater importance. See
Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶ 48, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421.
29. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 718, 596 N.W.2d at 779.
30. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶ 49, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421; Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at
718–19, 596 N.W.2d at 779.
31. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶ 30, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421.
32. Id.
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discretion to trial court judges on matters of juror bias.

33

B. A Brief Overview of the Case Law in the Faucher and Pre-Faucher
Era
Because discussion of the case law leading up to and culminating in
34
the Faucher case already exists, I will only briefly discuss these cases
and highlight their contributions to the current juror candor
jurisprudence. As illustrated in Sarvenaz Raissi’s Comment, Analyzing
Juror Bias Exhibited During Voir Dire in Wisconsin: How to Lessen the
Confusion, Wisconsin juror bias jurisprudence prior to Faucher
35
36
culminated in the cases of State v. Louis, State v. Gesch, State v.
37
38
39
Ramos, and State v. Ferron. In addition, cases such as State v. Wyss
40
and State v. Delgado are of particular importance in juror candor cases.
These cases place a great amount of discretion in the hands of trial
court judges to make determinations of juror bias, particularly Louis, in
which the court refused to adopt a per se rule against seating police
41
officers of the jurisdiction where the crime occurred. Instead, the court
emphasized the trial court judge’s role in assessing the juror’s
impartiality, which must be undertaken in all circumstances absent a
42
The Gesch decision stretched the
specific statutory exclusion.
boundaries of Louis by stating that certain close relationships between
33. See, e.g., State v. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481, 496–97, 579 N.W.2d 654, 660–61 (1998).
34. See Raissi, supra note 3.
35. State v. Louis, 156 Wis. 2d 470, 457 N.W.2d 484 (1990).
36. State v. Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d 660, 482 N.W.2d 99 (1992).
37. State v. Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d 12, 564 N.W.2d 328 (1997), overruled by State v. Lindell,
2001 WI 108, 245 Wis. 2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223.
38. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481, 579 N.W.2d 654.
39. State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 370 N.W.2d 745 (1985).
40. State v. Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d 270, 588 N.W.2d 1 (1999).
41. State v. Louis, 156 Wis. 2d 470, 474, 457 N.W.2d 484, 486 (1990); see Raissi, supra
note 3, at 519.
42. Louis, 156 Wis. 2d at 479–80, 457 N.W.2d at 488. The court in Louis further
demonstrated that past decisions have allowed the trial courts discretion in refusing to strike
jurors for cause so long as the trial courts engaged in inquiry into the juror’s impartiality. Id.
at 480–81, 457 N.W.2d at 489; see Nyberg v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 400, 404–05, 249 N.W.2d 524,
526 (1977), overruled by Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481, 579 N.W.2d 654; McGeever v. State, 239
Wis. 87, 97, 300 N.W. 485, 489 (1941); see also Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d at 15, 564 N.W.2d at 330;
State v. Chosa, 108 Wis. 2d 392, 395–96, 321 N.W.2d 280, 282 (1982) (explaining that the trial
court judge may not exercise discretion as to a juror’s bias based on some observable
characteristic without first questioning the individual jurors about their inability to be
impartial).
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trial participants and prospective jurors result in an implied or
“unconscious bias,” and thus, the trial court had erred by refusing to
strike a juror who was related to a State witness despite finding the
43
juror’s statements of impartiality credible. Ramos, which has since
been overruled, demonstrates the emphasis placed on achieving
impartiality in voir dire in this era, because under the rule of that case, a
trial court’s error in refusing to strike a juror for cause would be grounds
44
for automatic reversal.
In addition, Ferron emphasized, like much of Wisconsin’s juror bias
jurisprudence, that when it comes to juror bias determinations, the trial
45
Ferron instructed trial courts to
court’s assessment is paramount.
46
strike prospective jurors these courts could “reasonably suspect” to be
47
biased; however, it overruled Nyberg v. State by stating that appellate
48
courts were not held to this same standard upon review.
In Ferron, a juror was left on the jury after he expressed doubts
about whether he could remain impartial knowing that the defendant,
Ferron, would be exercising his Fifth Amendment right and not taking
49
the witness stand. The court did not accept Ferron’s arguments that
50
the reasonable suspicion test should also apply at the appellate level,
instead stating that refusals to strike jurors for cause at the trial court

43. State v. Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d 660, 666–67, 482 N.W.2d 99, 102 (1992); see Raissi, supra
note 3, at 520 (providing a summary of the court’s decision).
44. Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d at 24–25, 564 N.W.2d at 334; see Raissi, supra note 3, at 521.
45. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d at 496–97, 579 N.W.2d at 660 (“It is a well-settled principle of
law in this state that a determination by a circuit court that a prospective juror can be
impartial should be overturned only where the prospective juror’s bias is ‘manifest.’”).
46. Id. at 495–96, 579 N.W.2d at 660.
47. Nyberg, 75 Wis. 2d 400, 249 N.W.2d 524.
48. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d at 496–97, 579 N.W.2d at 660 (explaining that appellate courts
are not required to displace a trial court ruling on a prospective juror’s impartiality, whenever
the appellate record supports a reasonable suspicion of juror bias). Thus, the Ferron decision
is yet another example of the State’s previous policy of allowing great deference to the trial
court’s discretion. See id.
49. Id. at 488, 579 N.W.2d at 657. Juror James Metzler stated, “Well, I would have a
hard time believing that he was innocent if he didn’t take the stand and tell me he wasn’t [sic]
innocent. That’s just my own belief.” Id. When asked if he would be able to consider only
the evidence presented and set aside this opinion, Mr. Metzler gave responses of, “Well, I
would certainly try to set it aside” and “Probably.” Id. at 489, 579 N.W.2d at 657. For a full
transcript of the exchange between counsel and Juror Metzler, see Raissi, supra note 3, at
522–23.
50. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d at 497, 579 N.W.2d at 661.
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level is reversible error only when bias is manifest. Bias is manifest
when the record does not support a finding that the “juror is a
reasonable person who is sincerely willing to put aside an opinion or
prior knowledge; or . . . does not support a finding that a reasonable
person in the juror’s position could set aside the opinion or prior
52
knowledge.” However, despite adopting a standard granting seemingly
broad power of discretion to trial court judges, the end result of Ferron
(finding error in refusing to excuse juror Metzler for cause) seemed to
53
simultaneously withdraw some of the trial court’s discretion. However,
this apparent incongruence, as I will discuss later in the Part IV of this
Comment, did not appear as drastic in the court of appeals decision in
54
State v. Oswald.
In addition to Louis, Gesch, Ramos, and Ferron, the decision of State
55
v. Delgado is of importance to the pre-Faucher era and is also
important as a point for comparison to the decision in Funk because of
its similar factual circumstances. In Delgado, the defendant was found
guilty of committing six counts of first-degree sexual assault against two
56
young girls. During voir dire, Juror C failed to disclose that she had
been a victim of sexual assault as a child, despite questions being posed
57
to the jury as a whole, as well as to Juror C individually. For example,
each juror was asked whether he or she had been either a victim or a
58
witness to a crime. Later Juror C revealed in an emotional outburst
59
during jury deliberations that she was a past victim of sexual assault. In
addition, in a post-trial hearing on the defendant’s motion for a new

51. Id. at 496–97, 579 N.W.2d at 660.
52. Id. at 498, 579 N.W.2d at 661.
53. Id. at 510–11, 579 N.W.2d at 666 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (explaining how the
majority has seemingly “violate[d] its own test” by overruling the trial judge’s assessment of
the juror based on the statement of the juror being too unequivocal in the record).
54. State v. Oswald, 2000 WI App 3, 232 Wis. 2d 103, 606 N.W.2d 238.
55. State v. Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d 270, 588 N.W.2d 1 (1999). Like in Funk, in Delgado
the court had to face the question of how to deal with a juror in a sexual assault case who did
not disclose having been a victim to a sexual assault herself. Id. at 272–73, 588 N.W.2d at 2.
56. Id. at 272, 588 N.W.2d at 2.
57. Id. at 273–74, 588 N.W.2d at 3. When asked whether she had ever been a victim or
witness of a crime, Juror C stated that she had not. Id. at 274, 588 N.W.2d at 3. Further, the
jury as a whole was asked, “Are there any members of the jury panel who either have a close
friend or close relative or you yourself who have been the victim of a sexual assault, either as
a child or as an adult?” Id. at 274–75, 588 N.W.2d at 3 (internal quotes omitted).
58. Id. at 273–74, 588 N.W.2d at 3.
59. Id. at 273–75, 285, 588 N.W.2d at 3–4, 8.
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trial, Juror C stated that she had answered the questions honestly as she
believed they should be answered and was not biased against the
60
defendant.
Surprisingly, the trial court judge found Juror C’s
testimony credible and upheld the conviction because she had not
61
incorrectly responded to a material question.
Delgado made two important contributions to juror bias case law.
First, although the decision relied on pre-Faucher terminology, it
stressed that just because there is no actual bias and a juror asserts his or
her impartiality, the court must nonetheless consider all the
circumstances of voir dire, including the fact of non-disclosure itself, to
62
Second, the Delgado case
determine whether the juror is biased.
stressed the importance of examining the similarity of the juror’s
experience to that of the victim, as well as observing jurors’ behaviors
63
during voir dire and deliberations. These contributions position the
court to protect its integrity and the right of litigants to an impartial trial
by demonstrating a respect for the complex nature of bias and how it
64
operates at both subconscious and conscious levels.
65
Finally, some discussion of the decision of State v. Wyss is required
to understand how grounds for a new trial are determined in Wisconsin
66
when a juror fails to accurately disclose information during voir dire.
As this Comment will later discuss, the case established the two-step
analysis used to determine whether a new trial is warranted based on a
67
However, what is more
juror’s concealment or lack of candor.
important for the purposes of this Comment is the reasoning advanced
by the court. First, the court acknowledged the justifications behind the
United States Supreme Court’s holding in McDonough Power
68
Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood that a per se rule of granting new trials

60. Id. at 276, 588 N.W.2d at 4.
61. Id. at 277, 588 N.W.2d at 4; see also State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 370 N.W.2d 745
(1985); infra text accompanying notes 94–95.
62. Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d at 285, 588 N.W.2d at 7 (explaining that despite a belief of
impartiality, “the juror’s conduct might have revealed such a close connection between the
juror and the case that bias may be inferred”).
63. Id. at 285–86, 588 N.W.2d at 7–8.
64. See id.; infra notes 175–80 and accompanying text (explaining the complex nature of
juror bias and the cautious approach courts should take towards juror bias).
65. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 370 N.W.2d 745.
66. Id. at 726, 370 N.W.2d at 766.
67. Id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 92–93.
68. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553 (1984).
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69

in all of these situations would be too costly.
Second, the court
modified the two-step analysis of McDonough because the test failed to
consider the possibility that a juror may answer honestly, yet still
70
However, only later cases, such as
provide an incorrect response.
Ferron and Funk, demonstrate how to deal with situations where a juror
incorrectly answers a question during voir dire and what types of
71
“exceptional circumstances” may allow bias to be inferred.
III. STATE V. FUNK
In Funk, the defendant was accused of having committed multiple
sexual assaults against a minor who was ten years old at the time of the
72
alleged acts. Around the time voir dire began, the court stressed the
inflammatory nature of the case to the jury, as well as informed them
that they would be asked questions regarding whether they had been
victims of a sexual assault themselves or if they knew anyone who had
73
been a victim. Further, the judge gave special instructions regarding
these questions, stating:
With respect to [these] question[s], to be quite frank with you, if
somebody asked me . . . I wouldn’t answer [them], but you are
under oath; maybe it’s a brother or a sister, maybe it’s a
neighbor, or maybe it’s yourself.
We could go into chambers, if you wish to; we certainly don’t
have to. You need to be honest. You need to answer the
question, and what we will do is to avoid any embarrassment, we
74
can go into chambers.
Despite this warning, neither the attorneys nor the judge asked these
75
questions of the jury directly.
However, some jurors disclosed
information about personally being a victim of a sexual assault or
knowing someone who was in response to other questions, and the
prosecution did state, “Now, this case, as Judge Roemer noted, involves
allegations of sexual assault of a child. Based upon those allegations,
69. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d at 724–25, 370 N.W.2d at 765–66.
70. Id. at 726–27, 370 N.W.2d at 766–67.
71. Id. at 729, 370 N.W.2d at 768 (quoting McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 464 U.S. at
556–57 (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
72. State v. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶ 3, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421.
73. Id. ¶ 4.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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those charges, does anyone here believe they would have a difficult time
76
being fair and impartial both to the State and to the Defendant?” This
question led to further admissions by jurors as to sexual assaults
committed against them or people they knew, which resulted in two
77
further exclusions from the jury. Of the two replacement jurors, one
admitted to knowing someone sexually assaulted, was replaced, and
then his replacement was also replaced having known a relative
incarcerated for sexual assault and admitting that he would not be able
78
to be impartial.
Despite all of this activity during voir dire, one particular juror,
“Tanya G.,” remained silent as to having been a victim of sexual assault
79
in 1998, while roughly the same age as the victim, having known of her
80
two younger sisters being so abused, and having been a victim to
81
another sexual assault in 2005. Furthermore, Tanya G. remained silent
when questions were asked by Funk’s attorney as to whether any jurors
82
had previously testified in a criminal or civil case, despite having
83
testified against the perpetrator of the 2005 assault. After the trial,
when Funk’s attorney learned that Tanya G. was a victim of sexual
84
assault, he moved to vacate the judgment, and a post-conviction
85
evidentiary hearing was held. At the hearing, Tanya G. was asked
various questions regarding whether she was made uncomfortable
during trial or thought about her past incidents during the course of the
86
trial, to which she replied with a simple “No” to each question.
However, when asked about why she failed to disclose the incidents,
Tanya G. responded that a settlement agreement, subject to a penalty,
prevented her from disclosing any information regarding her 1998
87
sexual assault. However, she admitted that she probably should have
discussed her sisters’ assaults, but withheld because they had “nothing
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. ¶¶ 5–6.
Id. ¶ 6.
Id. ¶¶ 7–8.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id. ¶ 13.
Id. ¶ 14.
Id. ¶ 10.
Id. ¶ 14.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id. ¶ 15.
Id. ¶ 18 n.11.
Id. ¶ 16.
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else on their records indicating sexual assault, [so she] wasn’t allowed to
88
put them in jeopardy.” In regards to the 2005 sexual assault, Tanya G.
indicated that she did not disclose the information because it was
information that she strived to suppress, and that to recount the memory
89
was “not the way [she] live[d] [her] life.” In light of Tanya G.’s failure
to respond to voir dire questions, the trial court found her to be both
subjectively and objectively biased, vacated the judgment of conviction
90
against Funk, and ordered a new trial.
After the order was affirmed by the court of appeals, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court granted review to determine whether the trial court
91
properly applied both the objective and subjective bias standards. The
92
to
court applied the two-step test, announced in State v. Wyss,
determine whether a new trial is warranted. The Wyss test requires “(1)
that the juror incorrectly or incompletely responded to a material
question on voir dire; and if so, (2) that it is more probable than not that
under the facts and circumstances surrounding the particular case, the
93
juror was biased against the moving party.” The court found that the
first element was satisfied, but reinstated the verdict of conviction,
94
because the latter element was not. To support this conclusion, the
court demonstrated how the trial court had inappropriately reached
95
conclusions as to both objective and subjective bias.

88. Id.
89. Id. ¶ 17. Although doing one’s best to forget a tragic occurrence is an admirable
goal, it should not take precedent over litigant’s rights to an impartial trial, especially where,
as here, the judge took extra precaution to protect prospective juror’s privacy. See U.S.
CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing the right to an impartial trial); WIS. CONST. art. I, §§ 5,
7(same); see also NANCY GERTNER & JUDITH H. MIZNER, THE LAW OF JURIES 110 (5th ed.
2011) (providing that if juror privacy were endangered by constitutional voir dire
requirements, the constitutional right to an impartial jury would have to supersede jury
privacy concerns).
Furthermore, even suppressed memories have the potential to
subconsciously influence a person and may surface into an active memory at any point in
time. See generally Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Reality of Repressed Memories, 48 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 518, 518 (1993) (discussing various instances and studies of repressed
memory cases in the legal system).
90. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶ 23, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421.
91. Id. ¶¶ 24, 28–29.
92. State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 726, 370 N.W.2d 745, 766 (1985).
93. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶ 32, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421 (quoting Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d
at 726, 370 N.W.2d at 766).
94. Id. ¶ 64.
95. Id. ¶¶ 44–62 (explaining why a finding of bias was inappropriate under each
standard).
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Regarding subjective bias, the court stressed the failure of both the
trial court and the attorneys to ask Tanya G. directly about the sexual
assaults during voir dire and the fact that none of Tanya G.’s assertions
96
were explicit assertions of bias. The court’s analysis for objective bias
97
was similar.
The court essentially concluded that Tanya G.’s past
experiences and silences were not enough, in light of her statements of
98
impartiality, to render her incapable of being impartial. The court’s
emphasis on the failure of the trial court and attorneys to probe more
deeply into Tanya G.’s potential bias before finding her incapable of
being impartial illustrates that our current case law may possess a high
99
tolerance for juror bias. How this heightened tolerance is created and
the threat it poses will be further explored after first reviewing the case
law preceding and subsequent to the Faucher decision to understand the
development of Wisconsin’s juror bias jurisprudence.
While the goal of creating the new terminology was to set standards
that reflect the reason for juror removal, as well as to describe the
100
analysis of the judge, the new standards nonetheless caused much
101
disagreement amongst the Wisconsin Supreme Court. In Funk, Justice
Abrahamson, in her dissent, went so far as to say that the objective and
102
subjective categories were destined to be combined.
While some
discussion regarding the confusion of this new standard was already
103
launched in 2000, there has been little to no commentary on voir dire
in Wisconsin since. A more thorough examination of the topic is
necessitated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in Funk, along
104
with an overall lack of guidance in juror candor cases as to the extent
of the trial judge’s discretion during voir dire or the amount of
105
responsibility placed on attorneys to draw out juror bias.

96. Id. ¶¶ 44–45.
97. See id. ¶ 49.
98. See id. ¶¶ 49–63.
99. See id. ¶ 63.
100. State v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 706, 596 N.W.2d 770, 773 (1999).
101. Funk, 2011 WI 62, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421.
102. Id. ¶¶ 70–73 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting); see also Raissi, supra note 3, at 538.
103. See generally Raissi, supra note 3, at 521 (providing discussion of the confusion
caused by juror bias case law).
104. See, e.g., State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 742, 370 N.W.2d 745, 774 (1985).
105. See Raissi, supra note 3, at 529–30. Raissi illustrates an example of a discussion of
juror candor, id., which I argue should be revisited in light of the Funk decision.
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IV. CASE LAW POST-FAUCHER AND APPELLATE APPLICATIONS OF
THE FAUCHER RULE
Just as the interpretation used by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in
Funk raises doubts about which policies are embodied by Wisconsin
juror bias jurisprudence and precedent set by the Faucher era decisions,
subsequent applications further call into question the court’s decision to
106
overturn the trial court’s use of discretion in ordering a new trial.
An interesting fact situation presented an opportunity for the court
to affirm the principle that under circumstances that are “so fraught
with the possibility of bias . . . [the court] must find objective bias
107
regardless of the particular juror’s assurances of impartiality.” In State
v. Tody, Judge Eaton found himself in an awkward position: forced to
consider his mother’s ability to be an impartial juror in a trial over which
108
Furthermore, after neither party exercised a
he was presiding.
peremptory challenge to remove Ms. Eaton, the judge found himself in
an even more difficult situation based on his belief that he did not “have
any legal basis for excusing her,” and he reluctantly denied a motion to
109
strike her from the jury. The Wisconsin Supreme Court indicated that
Judge Eaton’s belief was misplaced, and in overturning both the trial
court and court of appeals decision, announced that:
The correct principle of law that should have guided the circuit
court judge is that a circuit court judge should err on the side of
dismissing a challenged juror when the challenged juror’s
presence may create bias or an appearance of bias. The reason
for this principle of law is that a circuit court’s striking a
prospective juror who raises issues of bias saves judicial time and
110
resources in the long run.
The court justified its conclusion on the fact that previous case law
has demonstrated the pervasive effects of juror bias on the overall trial
process, and that such a “defect affecting the framework within which
the trial proceeds,” should be dealt with at the trial court level because
106. The Faucher-era decisions seem to place a great amount of authority into the hands
of the trial court, as well as weigh heavily the idea that the court should err on the side of
caution and maintaining an appearance of impartiality. See supra Part II.
107. State v. Tody, 2009 WI 31, ¶ 5, 316 Wis. 2d 689, 764 N.W.2d 737.
108. Id. ¶¶ 10, 16.
109. Id. ¶ 17; see also id. ¶ 16 (demonstrating Judge Eaton’s reservations about allowing
his mother to serve as a juror).
110. Id. ¶ 32.
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of the grave effects of bias on the “fairness, integrity, or public
111
reputation of judicial proceedings.”
The implications of this decision are twofold. First, the decision
demonstrates an important policy consideration that it is better for the
judge, for the sake of judicial economy and integrity, to err on the side
of caution in striking jurors in situations where a juror may be biased or
112
Second, the case shows the
may create “an appearance of bias.”
strong respect for trial court discretion that was also crucial in decisions
113
114
such as State v. Louis and State v. Gesch. The idea that trial courts
should err on the side of caution and their judgments should be given
special deference in these situations seemed to be a powerful theme in
prior Wisconsin case law and is also embodied in case law at the federal
115
level.
116
A case more recent than Funk, State v. Sellhausen, potentially
111. Id. ¶ 44.
112. Id. ¶ 32; see, e.g., State v. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481, 495–496, 579 N.W.2d 654, 660
(1998) (discussing that past case law has traditionally promoted trial courts to act in this
cautious fashion).
113. State v. Louis, 156 Wis. 2d 470, 479, 457 N.W.2d 484, 488 (1990).
114. State v. Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d 660, 666, 482 N.W.2d 99, 102 (1992); see also Tody, 2009
WI 31, ¶ 29, 316 Wis. 2d 689, 764 N.W.2d 737.
115. See, e.g., Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d at 495–96, 579 N.W.2d at 660; infra text accompanying
note 124. Granting deference to the credibility determinations of the trial judge is a policy
that is seen in varying contexts in federal courts. See, e.g., United States v. Curb, 626 F.3d
921, 925 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining that in the context of sentencing hearings the appellate
court “do[es] not second guess the judge’s credibility determinations because he or she has
had the best opportunity to observe the subject’s facial expressions, attitudes, tone of voice,
eye contact, posture and body movements” (quoting United States v. Mancillas, 183 F.3d 682,
701 n.22 (7th Cir. 1999))); Kadia v. Gonzalez, 501 F.3d 817, 819 (7th Cir. 2007) (explaining the
federal policy of deference to the trial judge’s determination of credibility in the context of
asylum cases). The court in Kadia, aptly explained the difficulty of credibility assessments by
stating:
Credibility assessments can embody a struggle between norms of subjective and
objective decision-making. Subjective assessments are highly personal to the
decision-maker, dependent on personal judgment, perceptions, and disposition, and
often lacking in articulated logic. They are very difficult to review and are likely to
be inconsistent from one decision-maker to another.
Id. (quoting Michael Kagan, Is Truth in the Eye of the Beholder: Objective Credibility
Assessment in Refugee Status Determination, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J., 367, 374 (2003)).
116. State v. Sellhausen, 2012 WI 5, 338 Wis. 2d 286, 809 N.W.2d 14. Although
implicating a per se objective bias standard for judge’s immediate family members by
emphasizing the best practice is to avoid the appearance of bias, the court did not make a per
se standard explicit in Tody, but rather held that a judge’s mother would be objectively
biased. Tody, 2009 WI 31, ¶¶ 37–39, 316 Wis. 2d 689, 764 N.W.2d 737.
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retreated from the standard set forth in Tody—there, Justice Ziegler’s
concurrence indicated that a judge’s immediate family member is not
117
per se objectively biased. However, the court did not stray from the
consistent theme of juror bias case law—that determinations of juror
bias should be left to the broad discretion of the trial judge—and noted
that it was still within the inherent authority of the judge to strike such a
118
juror for cause if the judge believed he or she could not be impartial.
Further, the case considered a familial relationship less close (the
judge’s daughter-in-law) than the one at issue in Tody (the judge’s
119
mother). While some may interpret this decision as a death knell to
the notion that courts should avoid the appearance of bias, as this is the
120
argument that the defendant in Sellhausen relied upon, this argument
is misplaced. A judge is supposed to be a neutral party, and thus a
family member of a judge should not demonstrate any partiality to
either party in the absence of other facts drawn out during voir dire.
Further, the Wisconsin Supreme Court made specific note of the
precautions taken by the trial court judge to avoid the appearance of
impropriety and that this practice was sufficient to avoid following the
typical recommended course of action and removing the family member
121
sua sponte.
122
Similar to Tody, the court in State v. Lindell alluded to the
123
principle raised in State v. Ferron, instructing trial court judges to err
on the side of caution and strike jurors whenever they “reasonably
124
suspect” that juror bias exists. In Lindell, the defendant was convicted
of intentional homicide, arson, and burglary; he appealed his conviction
on the grounds that he was required to use a peremptory challenge on a
125
Because of the
juror who should have been removed for cause.
117. See Sellhausen, 2012 WI 5, ¶ 73, 338 Wis. 2d 286, 809 N.W.2d 14 (Ziegler, J.,
concurring). The Sellhausen majority did not go so far as to hold that a family member was
per se objectively biased. See id. ¶¶ 29–30 (majority opinion).
118. Id. ¶¶ 73, 75.
119. Id.
120. See id. ¶ 29.
121. Id.
122. State v. Lindell, 2001 WI 108, 245 Wis. 2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223.
123. State v. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481, 495–96, 579 N.W.2d 654, 660 (1998).
124. Id.; see also State v. Tody, 2009 WI 31, ¶ 46, 316 Wis. 2d 689, 764 N.W.2d 737
(explaining that the appearance of bias should be avoided); Lindell, 2001 WI 108, ¶ 49, 245
Wis. 2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223 (instructing courts to err on the side of caution in striking jurors
that appear biased).
125. Lindell, 2001 WI 108, ¶¶ 5–8, 245 Wis. 2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223.
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intensity of media coverage of the event, there was a great deal of
concern by the court and the parties as to whether an impartial jury
126
could be impaneled.
During the course of voir dire, the defense
counsel asked to remove a juror who had done business with the
deceased victim and had been close friends with the victim’s wife for
127
The court denied the request indicating that the
over twenty years.
128
juror’s assurances of impartiality precluded it from doing so.
On review, the Wisconsin Supreme Court indicated that the trial
judge’s conclusion that he was incapable of removing the juror was
incorrect; not only could he have removed the juror, but also he erred in
129
failing to do so. The court concluded that juror D.F. was objectively
biased based on the totality of the circumstances, as a reasonable person
in her position could not have remained impartial and thus should have
130
However, the court overruled Ramos by
been struck for cause.
131
Under Ramos, an automatic reversal was
upholding the conviction.
required whenever a court failed to appropriately strike a juror for
132
cause and consequently deprived a defendant of a peremptory strike.
The court found that the Ramos rule would grant too much protection
to defendants and require trials even where no harm was likely caused
133
by the defendant’s use of a peremptory challenge. Although measures
promoting the efficiency of jury selection should be approached
134
cautiously, as they sometimes come at the cost of impartiality, the
effect of the ruling in Lindell appears to appropriately balance the

126. Id. ¶¶ 16–20. In fact, the defendant made numerous attempts to alleviate this
problem by asking for individual voir dire of prospective jurors, attempting to switch venue,
and sending out extensive jury questionnaires. Id. ¶¶ 18–19.
127. Id. ¶¶ 23–25.
128. Id. ¶ 25.
129. Id. ¶ 41.
130. Id.
131. Id. ¶ 131.
132. State v. Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d 12, 24–25, 564 N.W.2d 328, 334 (1997), overruled by
Lindell, 2001 WI 108, 245 Wis. 2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223; see State v. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481,
514, 579 N.W.2d 654, 667 (1998) (applying the Ramos rule).
133. See Lindell, 2001 WI 108, ¶¶ 104, 107, 115, 245 Wis. 2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223.
134. See State v. Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d 270, 280, 588 N.W.2d 1, 5 (1999) (stating that “the
value of finality and the sanctity of a jury verdict must yield when juror bias undermines
confidence in the fairness and impartiality of the trial”); Valerie P. Hans & Alayna Jehle,
Avoid Bald Men and People with Green Socks? Other Ways to Improve the Voir Dire Process
in Jury Selection, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1179, 1186–90 (1993) (demonstrating the undesirable
consequences of limited voir dire proceedings in failing to discover juror biases).
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ultimate goal of impartiality against practical considerations of judicial
135
efficiency.
Prior to both Lindell and Tody, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
provided an overview of juror bias case law shortly after the Faucher
136
decision in State v. Oswald, a case cited in Justice Bradley’s dissent in
137
Funk. Similar to Louis, Gesch, Faucher, and the majority of juror bias
jurisprudence at this point in time, the case showed a strong emphasis
138
on the breadth of a trial court’s discretion on the issue.
Also, the
Oswald case illustrated three situations which warrant the finding of
objective bias: (1) when a juror has a direct connection to crucial
139
evidence to be presented at trial, (2) when the juror “has a direct
140
connection to a dispositive issue in the case,” or (3) when a juror has
an inflexible negative attitude towards the criminal justice system in
141
general. The court further elucidated that a juror’s marriage to a law
enforcement officer was not a significant connection and that the trial
142
judge could have properly concluded that the juror could be impartial.
Aside from affirming the importance of granting deference to the

135. See Lindell, 2001 WI 108, ¶ 118, 245 Wis. 2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223; see also Ferron,
219 Wis. 2d at 514–15, 579 N.W.2d at 667–68 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (foreshadowing the
eventual overruling of the Ramos rule and recognizing that the right of the defendant is to an
impartial jury and not to be able to “shuffle a jury pool in their favor”).
136. State v. Oswald, 2000 WI App 3, ¶ 5, 232 Wis. 2d 103, 606 N.W.2d 238 (explaining
that the trial court’s assessments of subjective bias will only be overturned if clearly
erroneous, while objective bias determinations will be upheld so long as a reasonable judge
could have made the same conclusion). The court makes special note that the previous case
law has firmly entrenched the trial court with ultimate authority to decide issues of bias,
stating “Faucher, Kiernan, Mendoza and Erickson nail down the proposition that ‘questions
as to a prospective juror’s sincere willingness to set aside bias should be largely left to the
circuit court’s discretion.’” Id. ¶ 6 (quoting Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d at 501, 579 N.W.2d at 662).
For a summary of the case’s contribution to juror bias case law, see Raissi, supra note 3, at
533–36.
137. State v. Funk 2011 WI 62, ¶ 93, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421.
138. See supra text accompanying note 136.
139. Oswald, 2000 WI App 3, ¶ 9, 232 Wis. 2d 103, 606 N.W.2d 238; see also State v.
Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 707–09, 596 N.W.2d 770, 774 (1999) (demonstrating that where a
juror has preconceived notions of a key witness based on a relationship between the two, the
juror is objectively biased); Raissi, supra note 3, at 534.
140. Oswald, 2000 WI App 3, ¶ 11, 232 Wis. 2d 103, 606 N.W.2d 238; see Raissi, supra
note 3, at 534.
141. Oswald, 2000 WI App 3, ¶ 12, 232 Wis. 2d 103, 606 N.W.2d 238; see Raissi, supra
note 3, at 534.
142. Oswald, 2000 WI App 3, ¶ 21, 232 Wis. 2d 103, 606 N.W.2d 238; see Raissi, supra
note 3, at 535–36.
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trial court, the Oswald decision clarified that the seemingly elevated
demand placed on jurors’ statements of impartiality in Ferron was not a
standard applicable to other cases, but rather that the Ferron holding
143
was limited to the facts of that particular case. In addition, the Oswald
decision set forth an important framework for analyzing whether a
144
particular relationship or experience disqualifies a juror. By stressing
the important distinctions between the juror in State v. Erickson, who
145
had also been a victim of sexual abuse as a child, and the juror in
Faucher, who had expressed a direct relationship to a witness (and was
146
thus excluded), the court once again made clear that trial court judges
147
must determine whether a past experience has rendered a juror biased.
This assessment is to be based not only on the juror’s statements,
demeanor, and tone, but also on the proximity of the events in time and
148
their factual similarity. Oswald and Erickson shed light on how to deal
with situations in which jurors’ past experiences create a suspicion of
bias, a situation which the court faced in Funk, and also demonstrated
149
that this analysis is best suited for the trial court.
143. Oswald, 2000 WI App 3, ¶ 7, 232 Wis. 2d 103, 606 N.W.2d 238 (explaining that an
unequivocal assertion of impartiality is not required of jurors on voir dire, and the Ferron
case was limited to its unique factual circumstance—a juror who demonstrated bias against
the defendant based on his exercise of his Fifth Amendment right to not testify).
144. Id. ¶ 10 (explaining the decisions of Erickson and Faucher and the important
distinction between the two in terms of the closeness of the relationship or the proximity of
the experience that has potential for bias).
145. State v. Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 758, 763, 596 N.W.2d 749, 753 (1999).
146. State v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 732, 596 N.W.2d 770, 785 (1999).
147. Oswald, 2000 WI App 3, ¶ 10, 232 Wis. 2d 103, 606 N.W.2d 238.
148. Id. (stating that the remoteness in time between the Erickson juror’s sexual assault
experience and the current case “lessen[ed] the chance it would taint her judgment”); see also
State v. Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d 270, 286, 588 N.W.2d 1, 8 (1999) (explaining that Juror C’s
“emotional involvement” with the case is partially a product of “the close similarity of her
experience with the crimes charged”).
149. See Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d at 763, 596 N.W.2d at 753 (depicting the trial court's
assessment of Juror L. in State v. Erickson, which demonstrated an appropriate evaluation by
the trial court judge of the particular juror’s bias in light of her demeanor, responses, etc.).
The court’s analysis read as follows:
Well, [Juror L] is well into her 60’s. The event took place when she was about 12
years of age. She talked about it without showing any emotion. She was open and
seemed to be free of stress in discussing it. Her explanation that she didn’t report it
because she was ashamed is I think a very natural reaction. There [have] been
considerable writings in the press that the average person is likely to read which
report similar reactions from victims. Her contact was sudden and forced upon her
and of a sexual contact nature, a brief encounter, wholly different from what would
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However, as previously discussed, the majority in Funk chose not to
150
honor the trial court’s decision that Tanya G. was biased. Instead the
court overturned the trial court based upon on a review of the record of
Tanya’s responses to questions regarding her impartiality during voir
151
dire and at a post-conviction hearing. The court’s decision to ignore
the guidance of the trial court is troubling for two reasons. First, the
decision put too much faith in the juror’s recorded statements of
impartiality without the ability to consider the surrounding
152
circumstances and demeanor of the juror. Second, the court did not
appropriately weigh the likelihood of unconscious biases, based on the
153
similarity between Tanya’s past experiences and those of the victim.
V. JUROR REHABILITATION MUST BE APPROACHED WITH
CAUTION TO EFFECTIVELY PROTECT THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY
Theoretically, the ultimate purpose of voir dire is to attempt to
154
eliminate biased jurors in order to secure a fair and impartial jury. As

be presented here. I’m satisfied that she can act fairly and impartially.
Id. at 763–64 n.5, 596 N.W.2d at 753 n.5; see also State v. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶¶ 1–2, 335 Wis.
2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421; Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d at 285–86, 588 N.W.2d at 8; Oswald, 2000 WI
App 3, ¶ 10, 232 Wis. 2d 103, 606 N.W.2d 238.
150. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶ 64, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421; see supra text
accompanying notes 91–95.
151. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶¶ 1–2, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421.
152. See id. ¶¶ 2, 18 n.11; infra notes 167, 174, 176 and accompanying text (explaining
that there are numerous biases both conscious and unconscious and thus statements of
impartiality should be approached with caution and considered in light of the surrounding
circumstances).
153. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶¶ 2, 18 n.11, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421; see infra notes
167, 174 and accompanying text (explaining that there are numerous biases both conscious
and unconscious and thus statements of impartiality should be approached with caution and
considered in light of the surrounding circumstances).
154. JAMES J. GOBERT & WALTER E. JORDAN, JURY SELECTION: THE LAW, ART, AND
SCIENCE OF SELECTING A JURY 324 (2d ed. 1990) (“The theoretical purpose of voir dire is to
determine the state of the jurors’ minds so that a fair and impartial jury can be chosen”); see
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing the right to impartial jury); WIS. CONST. art. I, §§ 5, 7
(same); see State ex rel. La Crosse Tribune v. Circuit Court for La Crosse Cnty., 115 Wis. 2d
220, 239, 340 N.W.2d 460, 469 (1983) (stating that the purpose of voir dire is “to select jurors
who will make an impartial decision upon the basis of the evidence presented to them”);
United States v. Blount, 479 F.2d 650, 651 (6th Cir. 1973) (“The primary purpose of the voir
dire of jurors is to make possible the impaneling of an impartial jury through questions that
permit the intelligent exercise of challenges by counsel.”); Jennifer H. Case, Satisfying the
Appearance of Justice When Juror’s Intentional Nondisclosure of Material Information Comes
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one commentator notes, “[t]he attainment of this goal is placed in the
hands of the adversary process. The parties attempt to prevent from
sitting on the jury potential jurors who they suspect may harbor some
155
bias or prejudice against their respective clients.” In addition to acting
as a “filtering process” for prospective jurors, voir dire serves other
important functions, such as being an information-gathering tool for a
party to determine how to effectively use its peremptory challenges, as
156
well as an opportunity to build rapport with jury members. In regards
to the filtering role of voir dire, when a particular juror’s response or
demeanor raises a suspicion of bias, he or she will not necessarily be
157
Instead, for the sake of
immediately disqualified from jury service.
judicial economy, jurors are often subjected to a process called juror
158
rehabilitation.
It is true that obtaining qualified jurors can pose a substantial
obstacle to courts—as oftentimes jurors will fail to respond to requests
for service or will be disqualified by some personal factor or a recent
159
term of service.
Yet when a conflict arises between costs and
maintaining the impartiality and integrity of courts, the latter concern
should prevail.
Trial judges typically conduct juror rehabilitation during voir dire

to Light, 35 U. MEM. L. REV. 315, 316 (2005) (“Voir dire examination . . . serves to protect a
litigant’s right to an impartial trier of fact”).
155. JEFFREY T. FREDERICK, MASTERING VOIR DIRE AND JURY SELECTION 2 (3d ed.
2011).
156. See id. at 2–4. Another possible function of voir dire is to educate jurors on legal
principles and prepare them for the judge’s instructions. See id. at 3–4. However, this is not
always agreed upon as a wise strategy. TED M. WARSHAFSKY & FRANK T. CRIVELLO II,
WISCONSIN PRACTICE SERIES: TRIAL HANDBOOK FOR WISCONSIN LAWYERS § 6:09 (3d ed.
2005) (explaining that many lawyers are tempted to use voir dire to educate jurors based on
the belief that jurors make up their minds early on in trial, but that this belief is misguided, as
jurors tend to see through these efforts, which may negatively affect rapport with the jury).
157. See infra notes 160–62 and accompanying text (explaining the concept of juror
rehabilitation).
158. WARSHAFSKY & CRIVELLO, supra note 156, § 6:15 (providing an overview of the
development of juror rehabilitation as the result of bleak economic realities and how this
development threatens the impartiality of the jury). For an overview of how juror
rehabilitation is becoming a greater issue in Wisconsin in light of recent social phenomena,
including social campaigns to instill jurors with biases towards certain types of lawsuits as well
as towards lawyers in general, see id. at 177.
159. See, e.g., THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT MARSHAL’S OFFICE, ANNUAL
REPORT 9–11 (2011).
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160

and after a juror presents facts indicative of bias. The process involves
a careful evaluation of the juror’s statements, demeanor, and tone in
response to being asked about whether they can set aside the potential
161
bias. A credible communication of impartiality is typically sufficient to
162
allow the juror to serve on the jury.
However, in Funk, the
overturning of the trial court order for a new trial is akin to the
Wisconsin Supreme Court’s rehabilitating juror Tanya G. based on the
face value of her statements on the record and in spite of the trial
judge’s analysis of her impartiality, given that the judge had the benefit
163
of face-to-face impressions of her demeanor.
This approach is a cause for concern, as it appears to place
164
Wisconsin among those states with liberal views of juror rehabilitation.
While adopting a view which essentially takes jurors’ statements at face
value, Wisconsin has jeopardized the right to an impartial jury by
ignoring the way that bias functions, as well as the crucial purpose of
voir dire in acting as the avenue for discovering and eliminating those
biases (or the appearance thereof) that are so strong that the legitimacy
160. Juror rehabilitation is one way in which courts attempt to save on the cost and time
of locating additional jurors, by exploring whether a juror is capable of setting aside potential
biases and remaining an impartial evaluator of the evidence. See Cosper, supra note 7, at
1474–75; see also GOBERT & JORDAN, supra note 154, at 53 (discussing whether knowledge is
incompatible with impartiality and concluding that the more appropriate question is the
extent to which the knowledge has impacted impartiality).
In the treason trial of Aaron Burr, Chief Justice John Marshall stated that a jury
completely free of any preconceived notions regarding guilt or innocence is likely impossible,
and thus the court is bound to consider whether the strength of these notions—those which
“leave the mind open to a fair consideration of that testimony, constitute no sufficient
objection to a juror.” United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 50–51 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
161. See Cosper, supra note 7, at 1474–75 (explaining how the process of juror
rehabilitation works generally).
162. Id. at 1474 (explaining that juror rehabilitation is not a term likely to be found in
law dictionaries, but it has become a “judicial tool of rising significance in courthouses across
the country”). The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that an affirmation of
impartiality by a juror, if accepted by the trial judge, should be granted special deference and
presumed correct. See, e.g., Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1039–40 (1984) (demonstrating
that the trial judge is in a superior position to evaluate whether a particular juror can be
impartial and whether the juror’s statements of impartiality are sincere).
163. See State v. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶¶ 63–64, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421; infra
Part VII.
164. See Cosper, supra note 7, at 1489 (explaining that a liberal view of juror
rehabilitation is one that allows extensive opportunity for a juror to be rehabilitated from
more extreme showings of bias, extensive questioning by the judge to rehabilitate a juror, and
little in terms of baseline measurements against which a juror’s response must be measured to
qualify for rehabilitation).
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of the jury’s verdict is easily called into question by members of the
165
public. To effectively serve as a means of achieving impartiality in jury
trials, an effective voir dire process must take account of the nature of
both the jury trial and of human biases, and of those biases, seek to
166
eliminate those that are most prone to poison the results of the trial.
Bias can arise from several different psychological phenomena, ranging
from past experiences to societal or mental pressures, which guide a
juror towards a given result based on a preconceived belief or feeling

165. GOBERT & JORDAN, supra note 154, at 49 (explaining that because of the secrecy
of jury deliberations, and the absence of a requirement to provide a reason for their verdict,
“[t]he guaranty of impartiality may be the most important safeguard of justice in an individual
case”).
The goal of jury selection is impartiality, and this goal is made difficult when it is an
appellate court is called on to review a determination of bias because:
an appellate court is left with only a written transcript to review, several months,
often several years, after the actual jury selection. This reality limits our ability to
fully assess the fairness and impartiality of an individual juror whom [it] [has]
neither heard nor observed. The written transcript that [it] review[s] is usually
limited only to the spoken word. Yet a juror cannot speak fairness or talk
impartiality. Fairness and impartiality are communicated.
State v. Lindell, 2001 WI 108, ¶ 140, 245 Wis. 2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223; see State v. Tody, 2009
WI 31, ¶ 47, 316 Wis. 2d 689, 764 N.W.2d 737 (which demonstrated that Wisconsin juror bias
case law, in addition to federal case law, has emphasized that the trial judge should err on the
side of caution and eliminate jurors who exhibit “even the appearance of impropriety, bias, or
prejudice” (quoting Elmore v. State, 44 S.W.3d 278, 280 (Ark. 2004))); see also Smith v.
Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982) (“Due process means a jury capable and willing to decide
the case solely on the evidence before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial
occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen.”).
Speaking on another important part of voir dire, the United States Supreme Court
stated: “[T]he peremptory satisfies the rule that ‘to perform its high function in the best way
“justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.”’”). Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219
(1965) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79 (1986)).
166. See Cosper, supra note 7, at 1483 (“[A] threat exists that group deliberations may
magnify small biases at an individual level. Thus, while the correlation between individual
bias and jury outcomes is unclear, the seating of one biased juror may have a drastic effect on
the outcome of the litigation.”); James J. Gobert, In Search of the Impartial Jury, 79 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 269, 269–71 (1988) (explaining that both the secrecy of jury verdicts, and
the extreme difficulty of appealing them, makes the impartial jury a greater necessity, as one
impartial juror might be particularly influential during jury deliberations); Newton N. Minow
& Fred H. Cate, Who Is an Impartial Juror in the Age of Mass Media?, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 631,
632 (1991); see also United States v. Vargas, 606 F.2d 341, 346 (1st Cir. 1979) (explaining that
when a juror betrays the trust of the court by concealing information, the only means of
redress is to determine whether there is enough bias or prejudice that maintaining the
legitimacy of trials requires a new trial).
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167

that stems from one of these phenomena. Because it is impossible for
each bias to be properly accounted for, keen trial lawyers attempt to
168
keep jurors who they believe will be sympathetic to their side.
However, the trial court judge is nonetheless obligated to eliminate
those jurors whose biases, whether openly admitted or inferred from the
circumstances, are so severe as to prevent them from considering and
169
deciding upon the evidence presented at trial. Determining whether a
particular juror’s bias necessitates a removal for cause, or in the case of
a later-discovered bias, a new trial, is a complicated question that is best
resolved by the trial court judge who can make use of his observations
of juror’s nonverbal expressions and carefully weigh the circumstances
170
of the case in light of an understanding of how bias operates. When

167. Cosper, supra note 7, at 1481 (describing how bias can arise from the tendency of
jurors to confirm pre-existing beliefs, which arise out of certain stereotypes and patterns of
behavior that are unique to the individual and tune out evidence that goes against these
beliefs). Furthermore, biases, such as “belief perseverance” (where greater weight is given to
information consistent with an earlier belief), are according more weight to information
presented earlier on or the strong tendency to remain fixed on a belief despite contrary
evidence as well as processing information guided by subconscious motivations. Id. at 1482–
83; see Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble?: Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J.
71, 74 (2000) (explaining that group deliberation tends to polarize group members to stronger
positions in alignment with their pre-existing beliefs).
168. Gobert, supra note 166, at 271 (explaining that the “difficulty and challenge
involved in identifying the components of impartiality is compounded by the fact that trial
lawyers do not seek impartial jurors”); see WALTER F. ABBOTT & JOHN BATT, A
HANDBOOK OF JURY RESEARCH 1–10 (1999) (stating that the object of juror evaluation is to
rid the jury pool of those jurors most favorable to the other side).
169. See State v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 716, 596 N.W.2d 770, 778 (1999) (illustrating
that currently in Wisconsin, “subjective bias is most closely akin to what we had called actual
bias, and . . . objective bias in some ways contemplates both our use of the terms implied and
inferred bias”). The court in Funk cites this same proposition. State v. Funk, 2011 WI 62,
¶ 36 n.16, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421; see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
155 (1878) (explaining that the biases to be concerned with are those “deep impressions”
which will cause a juror to ignore contrary evidence); GERTNER & MIZNER, supra note 89, at
62–63 (explaining that not all bias can be eliminated during voir dire and thus biases are
evaluated as “a question of degree and not kind”).
170. See Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶ 70, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421 (Abrahamson, J.,
dissenting). Chief Justice Abrahamson noted in her dissent:
A juror’s good-faith belief that she is not or was not biased, however, is not
necessarily an accurate belief. Even if we could be assured of truthfulness, some
people are incapable of making correct assessments of self, especially on an issue
such as bias. A juror may emphatically believe that she is not biased, yet
unknowingly lack the ability to be impartial.
Id.
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relying solely on juror statements of impartiality—particularly taking
the words alone from a court transcript at face value—the courts do not
adequately recognize the importance of “[t]he right to a fair and
impartial adjudication [which] extends not only to criminal defendants
171
but also to the government and, through it, to society.”
Justice
Cardozo explained the potential hazard of allowing a juror who has
172
concealed information on the jury in Clark v. United States:
The judge who examines on the voir dire is engaged in the
process of organizing the court. If the answers to the questions
are willfully evasive or knowingly untrue, the talesman, when
accepted, is a juror in name only. His relation to the court and to
the parties is tainted in its origin; it is a mere pretense and sham.
What was sought to be attained was the choice of an impartial
arbiter. What happened was the intrusion of a partisan defender.
If a kinsman of one of the litigants had gone into the jury room
disguised as the complaisant juror, the effect would have been no
different. The doom of mere sterility was on the trial from the
173
beginning.
Further, the fact that jurors’ statements of impartiality are often
motivated by pressure from the judge, a sense of civic obligation, or
pressure from other peers on the jury, regardless of the juror’s true
feelings, means that liberally accepting them is a dereliction of the duty
arising out of the right to an impartial jury that our judiciary and society
174
should not tolerate. As studies have shown, past experiences of jurors,
particularly those that can be closely assimilated to the trial or
relationships to key witnesses, pose a significant threat to the likelihood
of the jurors’ impartiality, and thus their statements must be taken as
175
only a single factor in evaluating their impartiality.
171. Chi. Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 371 F. Supp. 689, 691 (N.D. Ill. 1974), rev’d and
remanded, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975); see FREDERICK, supra note 155, at 11 n.6 (explaining
that a study demonstrated that rehabilitation during voir dire caused a reduction in the
number of jurors (both biased and unbiased) who believed the defendant guilty, as well as a
drop in confidence among those who held to the belief); GOBERT & JORDAN, supra note 154,
at 48. See generally Caroline B. Crocker & Margaret Bull Kovera, The Effects of
Rehabilitative Voir Dire on Juror Bias and Decision Making, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 212
(2010) (elaborating on the subject of juror rehabilitation).
172. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933).
173. Id. at 11.
174. Joshua S. Press, Untruthful Jurors in the Federal Courts: Have We Become
Comfortably Numb?, 21 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 253, 259 (2009).
175. See GOBERT & JORDAN, supra note 154, at 213 (providing that jurors who have
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Therefore, while Wisconsin courts attempt to evaluate jurors for
either objective or subjective biases, they should approach both tests
with the totality of the circumstances in mind, as this best reflects the
176
numerous sources of bias or concealment on the part of jurors.
Moreover, when a particular juror has been a victim of a crime,
Wisconsin courts should carefully analyze the similarity and nature of
the crimes, as well as any cues that can be gathered from the juror’s
177
tone, demeanor, and statements regarding his or her impartiality.
Also, if applicable, the court should inquire into the reason for a juror’s
178
failure to disclose that he or she had been a victim of a crime. Only
upon consideration of all of these factors can the court truly be said to
179
be fulfilling its duty to protect every litigant’s right to an impartial jury.
Focusing only upon the juror’s state of mind, as Wisconsin’s subjective
bias standard does, fails to properly detect bias and places upon the trial
lawyer a dangerous burden of sacrificing a conservative questioning
strategy designed to build rapport with the jury, an issue that will be
180
addressed in the next section.

been a victim of similar past crimes are more likely to identify with the victim); Scott E.
Culhane et al., Crime Victims Serving as Jurors: Is There Bias Present?, 28 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 649, 655 (2004). Important examples include the tendency of jurors who have been
victims of a crime similar to that at issue in the trial (or know of a close friend or relative who
was) to convict at higher rates than those who have not been a victim of crime, or have been a
victim of a dissimilar crime (even if violent). Id. The study found that the closer that the
crime at issue came to matching the juror’s previous victim experience, the higher the
conviction rate amongst those jurors. Id. It should be noted, however, that although the
difference in conviction rates was significant, it was not enough to lead the authors to
conclude that a per se rule of exclusion should apply, but rather that jurors who have been
past victims should be approached with particular caution. Id. at 657.
176. See Press, supra note 174, at 256–58 (explaining that reasons for jurors failing to
answer a question appropriately during voir dire are numerous and both conscious and
subconscious); supra text accompanying notes 25–26, 29.
177. See, e.g., State v. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶¶ 22–23, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421;
State v. Oswald, 2000 WI App 3, ¶ 10, 232 Wis. 2d 103, 606 N.W.2d 238.
178. In Funk, the trial court’s analysis of whether Tanya G. was objectively biased
included a comparison of the crimes which she had been victim to or witnessed, to those at
issue in the case. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶ 22, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421.
179. See Case, supra note 154, at 326 (explaining that generally, courts should be
permitted some discretion to make determinations in deciding to grant new trials when
nondisclosure occurs).
180. See Robert G. Loewy, Note, When Jurors Lie: Differing Standards for New Trials,
22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 733, 761–62 (1995) (explaining that a strictly juror misconduct or actual
bias standard is not an appropriate standard for deciding to grant a new trial). As Loewy
notes, the strict actual bias standard is inappropriate because:
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VI. THE APPEARANCE OF BIAS CANNOT PROPERLY BE
DETERMINED FROM VIEWING THE TRIAL RECORD:
INSTITUTING THE TRANSAMERICA RULE
Aside from cautioning against liberal juror rehabilitation, this
Comment does not seek to advocate higher standards for juror
placement, but rather to address the existing distribution of decisionmaking authority in seating jurors and making determinations on juror
bias. The trial court, which oversees the voir dire and trial and is
charged with the duty of ensuring an impartial trial, should be afforded
greater deference to the decisions it makes to effectuate that goal. One
of the most troubling aspects of the Funk decision is that the decision to
reinstate the verdict was based solely on an ex post facto review of the
trial court record and the responses of Tanya G. during voir dire and in
181
The trial judge was not consulted
the post-conviction hearing.
regarding the impressions upon which he based his assessment of Tanya
G, nor was he consulted regarding any observations he may have made
during the course of the trial and jury selection process, which ultimately
182
led him to the conclusion that she was in fact biased.
While characteristics such as demeanor, tone of voice, and facial
expressions are not traditionally considered “evidence,” their impact in

First, as Justice Brennan noted in McDonough, jurors are particularly reluctant to
admit their own biases. This is because most people are either embarrassed about
their biases or are unaware that they have biases, a problem that becomes even
more acute after the trial is over, both because the state may have a stronger
criminal contempt prosecution against the juror because the juror may be reluctant
to give any information that would upset a verdict that, in large part, reflects a
personal investment of time and energy.
Id. at 762. Likewise, Loewy explains why the actual bias standard is inappropriate “because it
fails to account for the unique procedural posture of a post-trial hearing when a juror lies
during voir dire.” Id. Additionally, Loewy argues that the important distinction is that jurors
who reveal biases during voir dire may be rehabilitated, whereas if the juror’s bias is not
revealed until later, no such option exists. Id.; infra notes 204–06 and accompanying text.
181. See Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶¶ 63–64, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421; see supra text
accompanying note 163.
182. See Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶ 64, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421. Such an approach
departs from previous case law that imparted both broad discretion to trial court judges, and
disregarded the superior position that trial judges are in to gather information about a juror’s
ability to be impartial based upon observable behaviors. See, e.g., State v. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d
481, 497, 579 N.W.2d 654, 660–61 (1998); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156–57
(1878) (“[T]he manner of the juror while testifying is oftentimes more indicative of the real
character of his opinion than his words. That is seen below, but cannot always be spread upon
the record.”).
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the jury’s determination of whether or not a particular witness is
183
credible cannot be denied.
Due to the obvious dangers and
complications that would be presented if the jury were allowed to make
findings on another juror’s bias during jury selection, the judge is called
upon to make crucial assessments as to the credibility of jurors whose
honesty may be in question after they fail to answer or incorrectly
184
answer a question posed during the jury selection process. Thus, the
judge must consider the same factors that would affect a jury’s
determination, such as those perceptions gathered from the prospective
185
juror’s behavior during the trial and jury selection.
When an appellate court reviews a trial judge’s determination on
juror bias, it does so without the information that can be gleaned from
186
circumstances such as the juror’s demeanor. One possible solution is
to institute a rule requiring appellate courts who are reviewing an issue
of juror bias (e.g., a challenge for cause ruling or a lack of juror candor
187
situation ) to consult with the trial judge regarding these impressions if
the trial record does not contain clear indications of the judge’s
reasoning behind either removing or refusing to remove a juror for
cause. Such a rule would function much like the rule in Wisconsin
workers’ compensation cases from Transamerica Insurance Co. v.
188
Department of Industry, Labor, & Human Relations, which prohibits
183. DAVID P. LEONARD & VICTOR J. GOLD, EVIDENCE: A STRUCTURED APPROACH
5 (2d ed. 2008); see 4A WIS. PL. & PR. FORMS § 33:140 (5th ed. 2009):
You should not reject the testimony of any witness from mere caprice or without
reason, but give the testimony of each witness the weight which you think it is
entitled to receive. If you believe that any of the witnesses have not stated the truth,
because of their appearance on the stand, the improbability of their statements, or
for any other reason, you may reject that testimony. However, you should not reject
it without due care.
4A WIS. PL. & PR. FORMS § 33:140.
184. See State v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 715, 596 N.W.2d 770, 777 (1999) (noting that
“[t]he requirement that a juror be indifferent is codified in [Wisconsin Statute] § 805.08(1) . . .
[which] requires the [trial] court to examine on oath each person who is called as a juror to
discover if he or she ‘has expressed or formed any opinion or is aware of any bias or prejudice
in the case.’” (quoting WIS. STAT. § 805.08(1) (1995–1996))).
185. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
186. See infra text accompanying note 213.
187. Faucher is an example of appellate review of a challenge for cause ruling. See
Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 596 N.W.2d 770. for an example of appellate review of a new trial
ruling based on a juror candor issue (where a juror failed to disclose information), see Funk,
2011 WI 62, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421, .
188. Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Dep’t of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 54 Wis. 2d
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the Labor and Industry Review Commission from overturning a hearing
officer’s finding of credibility without having access to each hearing
189
officer’s impressions of the witness.
While the Transamerica rule operates in a different context—
requiring evaluation of administrative law judge’s determinations of
witness credibility—the trial court judge’s role in determining juror bias
also relies heavily upon assessments of demeanor, tone, facial
expressions, and essentially boils down to a credibility determination by
the judge in evaluating the juror’s responses to questions regarding his
190
or her ability to be impartial. Thus, instituting the Transamerica rule
protects the parties’ due process rights by ensuring due deference to
those best positioned to make assessments of witnesses’ credibility; the
rule would require appellate courts to consult the impressions of trial
court judges regarding potentially biased jurors and would serve the
191
goal of impartiality and protect litigants’ due process rights.
272, 195 N.W.2d 656 (1972).
189. Id. at 282–83, 195 N.W.2d at 662.
190. Id.; see State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 730, 370 N.W.2d 745, 768 (1985) (“Bias may
be inferred from surrounding facts and circumstances. The trial court must be satisfied that it
is more probable than not that the juror was biased against the litigant.” (citing McCoy v.
Goldston, 652 F.2d 654, 659 (6th Cir. 1981))); see also Rose & Diamond, supra note 7, at 517
(“Based on their interpretation of the juror’s answers and demeanor, judges may choose to
regard the juror’s statement of fairness as credible (and, hence, choose not to excuse the juror
for cause), or they may decide to ‘overrule’ the person’s own self-assessment and dismiss the
juror for cause.”). Compare Transamerica, 54 Wis. 2d at 285, 195 N.W.2d at 663–64
(explaining that findings of fact in workmen’s compensation cases are not to be based merely
on conjecture), with Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 157 (1878) (explaining that the
record is often insufficient for findings of fact), Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶ 115, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799
N.W.2d 421 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (explaining that “[w]hen deciding whether a juror is
biased, a circuit court judge essentially must make a credibility determination”), and Funk,
2011 WI 62, ¶ 67, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (stating that
“a circuit court cannot blindly rely on a juror’s self-assessment”).
191. The court in Transamerica stated:
[W]here an examiner hears conflicting testimony and makes findings based upon the
credibility of witnesses, and the commission thereafter reverses its examiner and
makes contrary findings, the record should affirmatively show that the commission
had the benefit of the examiner’s personal impressions of the material witnesses . . . .
The demands of due process cannot be satisfied with anything less.
Transamerica, 54 Wis. 2d at 282–83 n.14, 195 N.W.2d at 662 n.14 (quoting Braun v. Indus.
Comm., 36 Wis. 2d 48, 57, 153 N.W.2d 81, 86 (1967)); see also State v. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481,
497, 579 N.W.2d 654, 660–61 (1998) (explaining that the trial court has the benefit of
observing juror’s demeanor during voir dire, whereas the appellate court must make its
assessment “from the cold, typewritten words of an appellate record”); Reynolds, 98 U.S. at
156–57.
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Instituting the Transamerica rule in the juror bias context will
promote the ultimate goal of voir dire, an impartial jury, which coincides
192
with the constitutional right of the accused in a criminal trial.
Additionally, such a rule would foster both judicial economy and
legitimacy by preventing embarrassing disagreements between trial and
appellate courts, as well as possibly deterring costly appeals on decisions
193
of a new trial. Likewise, the Transamerica rule would require greater
cooperation between lower and appellate courts, allowing for a more
integrated judicial system, as well as lessening the harsh effect of
seemingly hyper-technical requirements to either preserve a right to
challenge a refusal to remove a biased juror or grant a new trial when a
194
juror has concealed information.
In Funk, the majority placed significant emphasis on three facts: (1)
that there were no findings in the record upon which the trial court
judge made his finding that Tanya G. was subjectively biased, (2) that
Tanya G. was never asked specifically if she was a victim of sexual
assault during voir dire, and (3) that Tanya G. was not asked her reason
195
However, this
for why she did not disclose her past victimization.
196
emphasis is misplaced.
As Justice Marshall stated in his dissent in
197
Smith v. Phillips, “[t]he right to a trial by an impartial jury is too
important, and the threat to that right too great, to justify rigid
insistence on an actual proof of bias. Such a requirement blinks
198
reality.”
Trial counsel certainly must do their part to ensure that their client’s
right to an impartial jury is protected (including making sure that the
entire voir dire proceeding appears in the record and practicing effective
questioning methods), yet where counsel has employed a reasonable
strategy and a juror has nonetheless concealed information, the court

192. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; WIS. CONST. art. I, §§ 5, 7; see Case, supra note 154, at 316
(explaining that the purpose of voir dire is protecting each litigant’s right to an impartial
jury); Cosper, supra note 7, at 1475; FREDERICK, supra note 155, at 2.
193. See, e.g., Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶ 117, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421 (noting the
inefficiency in having to have a new trial).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 186–91.
195. See Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶¶ 48, 60, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421.
196. As the majority states rather contradictorily “[s]ubjective bias also may be revealed
through a juror’s demeanor, with a determination of bias resting on whether the circuit court
finds the juror credible.” Id. ¶ 46.
197. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982).
198. Id. at 231–32 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Case, supra note 154, at 316.
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199

should provide some leniency.
Dictating an overly strict standard,
such as that implicated by Funk, poses a potential threat to counsel’s
trial strategies during voir dire, which may hinder another oft-cited
200
important aspect of voir dire—building rapport with the jury.
While the effectiveness of both the voir dire and the jury system
201
itself is often questioned by legal scholars, the longstanding tradition
of both in our country, as well as the constitutional enshrinement of the
202
jury trial, make it unlikely that either is departing any time soon.
Thus, attorneys must face the realities of voir dire head on.
From what I have observed during several voir dire proceedings as a
judicial intern and law clerk and from the input of attorneys I have
spoken to, the voir dire process can be a challenge for jurors and
203
For jurors, the biggest challenge is accurately
attorneys alike.
answering potentially embarrassing or personal questions.
For
attorneys, the greatest challenges are maintaining focus of the jurors and
keeping a keen ear to jurors’ responses. To combat the tendency of
jurors to lose focus, attorneys should begin with easy and open-ended
questions to make the jurors feel at ease and to lay the foundation for
204
Thus, a wise trial counsel may
the next line of questioning.
strategically decide not to immediately jump to pointed questions about

199. See Loewy, supra note 180, at 747 (explaining that few states are willing to place
heightened questioning standards on lawyers, because they can cause drawn out voir dire
proceedings and strain attorney—juror rapport).
200. See, e.g., FREDERICK, supra note 155, at 3 (explaining that the second goal of voir
dire is building a favorable rapport with the jurors, which is done by showing respect and
interest in the jurors and making them feel at ease to promote an open forum).
201. Compare Marc Mezibov, The Mapplethorpe Obscenity Trial, LITIGATION, Summer
1992, at 12 (explaining the extensive efforts in jury selection undertaken by counsel), with
William C. Smith, Challenges of Jury Selection, 88 A.B.A. J. 34 (2002), and comparative law
articles regarding the jury system (explaining that jury selection is often misused by counsel as
an opportunity to explain the law, rather than to build rapport and eliminate biases), e.g.,
Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative Analysis and
Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 443, 469–99 (1997) (explaining the advantages
and disadvantages of a jury system).
202. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (addressing a right to a jury trial in a criminal context);
WIS. CONST. art. I §§ 5, 7 (guaranteeing a right to jury trial in both criminal and civil
contexts). See generally JAMES OLDHAM, TRIAL BY JURY: THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT
AND ANGLO-AMERICAN SPECIAL JURIES 1 (2006) (providing an overview of the
development of the American jury system).
203. See generally Alan M. Tuerkheimer, Persuading Jurors During Voir Dire, WIS.
LAW., Nov. 2006, at 14.
204. Id. at 16.
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unpleasant experiences, such as whether a person “or someone they
205
knew, had ever been a victim of sexual assault.” Instead, counsel may
attempt to build rapport with jury members by asking broader questions
to determine if these more offensive or private questions have to be
asked and also to limit the targets of these questions to preserve as
206
While arguably counsel
much rapport and juror privacy as possible.
has alternative methods to ensure juror privacy, such as the use of jury
questionnaires, the effectiveness of these procedures at actually
maintaining privacy has been questioned and may impose additional
207
costs on attorneys and their clients.
Regardless of whether these methods are available, Wisconsin courts
should be hesitant to restrict attorneys from forming effective
questioning strategies. Judges should also be less sympathetic to jurors
who fail to disclose information, as the same non-disclosure may occur
regardless of the method of questioning. However, this approach
towards allowing counsel to mold their own voir dire strategy appears to
be greatly hindered by the court in Funk. This is because the Funk
decision repeatedly placed blame on counsel for his questions being

205. State v. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶ 4, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421 (explaining that
counsel did not ask whether anyone had been a victim of sexual assault).
206. See FREDERICK, supra note 155, at 6 (explaining that Wisconsin follows a
combined method of jury selection, in which “[p]otential jurors are questioned in a group
where both individual and group questioning occurs”); GERTNER & MIZNER, supra note 89,
at 108 (finding that while there is no constitutional right of juror privacy, “the privacy of
prospective jurors [is] an appropriate factor to be considered in passing on a given voir dire
question”). In addition, jurors are capable of detecting when attorneys have ulterior motives.
See Tuerkheimer, supra note 203, at 16.
207. Joseph A. Colquitt, Using Jury Questionnaires; (Ab)using Jurors, 40 CONN. L. REV.
1, 16–29 (2007) (explaining that despite possible benefits of a more open ended questioning of
jurors, jury questionnaires may cause more damage through unnecessarily broad questioning,
reduced ability to interact and observe jurors, and the potential to place private identification
information into public record). It is not my intention to address the use of juror
questionnaires extensively in this Comment, and I will only briefly acknowledge that
currently their use is rising in popularity, although whether they are truly beneficial is still
open for debate. See id. While the use of jury questionnaires has become an increasingly hot
topic among scholars, some sources have indicated that despite all of the hype, questionnaires
are actually riddled with more costs then benefits. Id. at 17. Further, Colquitt argues that the
cost of jury questionnaires, which is significant, goes beyond merely dollars and cents. Id. at
17–18 (stating that “[i]t is not enough to weigh the utility of a questionnaire solely with regard
to its cost in dollars and time, although that cost alone is significant”). Nonetheless, others
insist that questionnaires are excellent time savers and more accurate at finding bias as people
are more willing to be truthful when forced to write down answers. See, e.g., FREDERICK,
supra note 155, at 167–68 (describing the apparent benefits of juror questionnaires).
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“inartfully posed” despite the probability that had Tanya G.
appropriately answered the question, further questions would have
208
revealed her past during voir dire. Placing such a burden to explore
every avenue on trial counsel when counsel has good reason to believe
that doing so is both a waste of time and potentially bad for their
rapport with the jury, runs against one highly-prevalent general criticism
209
of voir dire, that it is unnecessarily long and intrusive.
Instead, appellate judges should provide the same type of special
deference on findings of juror credibility that is currently afforded to
hearing officers in workers’ compensation cases using the Transamerica
210
rule. Instead of simply noting the absence of clear impressions on the
record, like Justice Roggensack’s opinion did in Funk, appellate judges
reviewing a trial court’s decision to grant a new trial based on juror
concealment should consult with the trial judge to gather his or her
211
After consulting with the trial
impressions of the juror in question.
judge, an appellate judge would still possess the power to overturn the
trial court’s decision if the trial judge’s impressions were found to be
baseless or clearly contrary to the record. However, requiring appellate
judges to consult trial judges on these matters would ensure that the
right to an impartial jury is carefully considered and the superior
position of the trial judge to gather invaluable non-verbal cues from
212
jurors is respected.
208. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶ 63, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421 (agreeing with the court
of appeals that Tanya G.’s non–answers were not sufficient for a finding of objective bias); see
supra note 180 and accompanying text (illustrating that there are numerous reasons for nondisclosure).
209. Loewy, supra note 180, at 747 (explaining that while many states impose a
materiality standard, few states are willing to impose a heightened specificity standard,
because such a requirement can produce extra lengthy voir dire proceedings). Asking specific
questions after there is a reason to believe that these questions are unnecessary “could also
put unnecessary strain on the lawyer/juror relationship.” Id.
210. See Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Dep’t of ILHR, 54 Wis. 2d 272, 282, 195 N.W.2d 656,
662 (1972).
211. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶ 48, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421 (illustrating the absence of
the trial judge’s findings on the record). Justice Roggensack’s opinion states:
A finding of subjective bias must be based on factual findings that show the specific
juror’s state of mind. No such findings were made here . . . . The court also did not
make any findings about her demeanor that indicated subjective bias . . . .
Accordingly, the circuit court’s finding that Tanya G. was subjectively biased against
Funk is not supported by facts of record and is clearly erroneous.
Id.; see also Transamerica, 54 Wis. 2d at 282–83, 195 N.W.2d at 662.
212. See Transamerica, 54 Wis. 2d at 282–83, 195 N.W.2d at 662; see also Funk, 2011 WI
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The Transamerica rule is grounded in common sense and scientific
213
understandings of human nature in the juror bias context. Non-verbal
gestures and expressions are an integral part of human communication,
and, thus, for our legal system to successfully accomplish its purpose as
an impartial means of resolving disputes and allegations, a keen
214
awareness of this aspect of human nature is mandatory. Because the
trial court judge is the only judicial authority who has the opportunity to
visually and aurally observe the juror’s tone and demeanor, he or she is
in the best position to determine whether a juror is sincere in his or her
assertions of impartiality as a “function of the circuit court’s experiences
215
and knowledge of human nature.”
While the results of scientific
studies concerning people’s ability to detect deception in others indicate
that generally people can only achieve a “chance” or fifty percent rate of
accuracy in detecting deception, other studies indicate that certain
people whose professions require a special interest in determinations of
216
truthfulness are consistently more accurate.
62, ¶ 48 n.14, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421. The decision in Funk appears to abandon any
notion of deference to the trial court, as well as recognize that there is more to be gathered
from juror’s expressions than the words that comprise them. Id. ¶ 48 (describing that the trial
court made no findings of fact regarding Tanya G.’s bias and thus neglecting the simple
powers of observation, which only the trial court is capable of exercising). Both federal and
Wisconsin state courts have shown strong support of trial court discretion in prior case law.
See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
213. Non-verbal behaviors are inextricably linked to communication. See Paul Ekman
& Wallace V. Friesen, Nonverbal Leakage and Clues to Deception, 32 PSYCHIATRY J. FOR
THE STUDY INTERNAL PROCESSES 88, 88 (1969) [hereinafter Ekman, Nonverbal Leakage]
(exploring the relationship between verbal and non-verbal communication and highlighting
that non-verbal communications are not simply redundant of simultaneous verbal
communications and that different body parts will convey different messages). See generally
Paul Ekman et al., Facial Expressions of Emotion: An Old Controversy and New Findings,
335 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 63, 64 (1992) (explaining the physiological
changes that the body undergoes when a certain facial expression is used, regardless of
whether the person truly intends to convey that emotion).
214. This Comment is not intended to extensively address theories of non-verbal
communications, but some understanding of the concepts is necessary to demonstrate the
importance of these communications as a source of information to trial judges in achieving
the most impartial jury possible. See generally Ekman, Nonverbal Leakage, supra note 213.
215. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶ 71, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421 (Abrahamson, J.,
dissenting) (explaining the basis on which trial court judges are to make determinations of
subjective bias). Studies have indicated that sixty to sixty-five percent of all communication
takes place through nonverbal behaviors. FREDERICK, supra note 155, at 43.
216. See Robin S. Edelstein et al., Detecting Lies in Children and Adults, 30 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 1, 8 (2006) (demonstrating that “average observer[s] [were] at chance when
discriminating between true and false statements,” but that others portrayed higher levels of
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Trial court judges handle countless jury trials in a given year and sit
upon a greater wealth of information (including non-verbal
communications of jurors) on which to assess a juror’s sincerity, unlike
217
appellate judges performing cold reviews of the court record. Should
this interest and experience prove insufficient in improving judges’
accuracy, the possibility of specialized training similar to that
undertaken by law enforcement personnel remains open. Even absent
such training, the judgment of the trial court judge should be respected
as it is grounded on some human intuition more closely connected to
218
that individual trial experience than the appellate court can claim.
Another suggested approach to this problem is to simply presume in
cases where jurors have not disclosed information during voir dire that
the juror is biased, requiring the judge to grant a new trial to maintain
219
the “appearance of justice.”
While it is difficult to dispute the
efficiency by which this method would preserve the appearance of

accuracy and additional study of these individuals may provide important information about
“specific behavioral or verbal cues,” which may be useful in training judges). Furthermore,
the presence of non-verbal leakage clues is a thoroughly studied phenomena, and while there
has been disagreement as to the accuracy of various clues, there is little doubt that much of
what a person intends, or does not intend, to communicate is exhibited by non-verbal
behavior. See generally Ekman, Nonverbal Leakage, supra note 213.
217. Paul Ekman, Maureen O’Sullivan & Mark G. Frank, A Few Can Catch a Liar, 10
PSYCHOL. SCI., 263, 264–65 (1999) [hereinafter Ekman, Few Can Catch a Liar]
(demonstrating that federal judges achieved an average of over 60% accuracy at detecting lies
or truthfulness in a study conducted by Paul Ekman, Maureen O’Sullivan, and Mark G.
Frank).
218. See id. at 265 (providing the results of the study of Paul Ekman and others,
indicating that “it is possible for some people to make highly accurate judgments about lying
and truthfulness without any special aids such as slowed motion, repeated viewing, and the
scoring of subtle changes by either trained coders or computer-based measurements”;
illustrating that groups with special interest or expertise in detecting deception performed
better than those who did not possess a special interest or expertise; describing that the task
which judges would be most likely to have to concern themselves with in examining jurors—
whether there are any signs of lying—was found to be the most accurately performed by
judges); see also Rose & Diamond, supra note 7, at 533 (demonstrating that the more
confidently a juror attests to his or her impartiality, the less likely that he or she is to be
excused); id. (“Further, confidence predicted some of the judges’ own impressions of the
jurors’ abilities to be fair”); id. at 535 (explaining that “judges may simply see value in using
confident self-reports as a cue for an ability and willingness to be fair, whereas attorneys do
not.”).
219. Case, supra note 154, at 337 (explaining that because perceptions of bias degrade
the integrity of the court in the eyes of the public, courts should eliminate even the
appearance of bias); see also supra text accompanying notes 111, 113 (demonstrating that the
notion of guarding against the appearance of bias is not unfamiliar to Wisconsin case law).
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justice, this approach creates the threat that counsel who become aware
of a juror’s non-disclosure during voir dire may fail to notify the court,
so that the counsel may preserve the right to a new trial if a favorable
220
result is not reached. While most appellate courts will not allow this to
occur, the possibility that a lawyer may attempt to conceal his
knowledge of the juror’s failed disclosure, as well as the needless delay
that will result if a new trial must be awarded, weigh against the use of
the “Missouri Rule,” which grants new trials whenever it is found that a
221
juror concealed information.
Therefore, instituting a Transamerica
type rule in juror bias situations is a better practice that is more fully
222
supported by the underlying policy considerations of voir dire, as well
as by logical and scientific understandings of human interactions than
223
the current approach.
VII. CONCLUSION: THE COURT’S DECISION IN STATE V. FUNK
THREATENS THE RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY AND DISREGARDS A
LONG LINE OF PRECEDENT SUPPORTING TRIAL COURT DISCRETION
IN DETERMINING JUROR BIAS
From the case law for juror bias in Wisconsin, as well as at the
federal level, it is clear that a strong policy towards granting trial court
discretion on determinations of juror bias was present but not
224
Furthermore,
sufficiently respected by the court’s decision in Funk.
the seemingly hyper-technical requirements that the decision places on
counsel to ask every possible question disrupts trial strategy and could
225
potentially impose additional costs to litigation. The majority decision
in Funk places the right to an impartial jury trial in peril, with the only
foreseeable benefit being the potential to save on the cost of new
220. See Loewy, supra note 180, at 747.
221. Case, supra note 154, at 338; Loewy, supra note 180, at 749; see also Vivion v.
Brittain, 510 P.2d 21, 24–25 (Wyo. 1973) (denying a motion for new trial based on theory that
juror failed to disclose involvement in prior litigation where counsel had actual knowledge of
this fact having taken part in that very litigation).
222. See supra text accompanying notes 166–80.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 213–14.
224. See, e.g., supra note 45; State v. Messelt, 185 Wis. 2d 254, 270, 518 N.W.2d 232, 239
(1994); Amirault v. Fair, 968 F.2d 1404, 1405 (1st Cir. 1992) (explaining that a juror’s
statements of impartiality are not conclusive proof of impartiality and that determinations of
juror credibility are uniquely suited to a trial judge’s discretion); see also Wainwright v. Witt,
469 U.S. 412, 428 (1985) (explaining that determinations or juror credibility are traditionally a
matter for the trial judge to decide); Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038 (1984).
225. See supra notes 205–07 and accompanying text.
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226

trials.
However, saving on this expense comes at the cost of
potentially stripping criminal defendants of their constitutional rights, as
227
well as the integrity of Wisconsin’s judicial system.
Moreover, simply presuming, like in the Missouri approach, that
jurors who do not disclose material information are biased would also
228
erode the integrity of Wisconsin courts. While this approach certainly
229
preserves the appearance of justice by eliminating jurors who create
suspicion for bias, it does not adequately consider the serious costs of
new trials to all parties involved. Instead, to best protect litigant’s rights
of due process, Wisconsin courts should provide special deference to the
trial court because the trial court maintains a superior position to
interpret the credibility of a juror either during voir dire or, in the case
230
of juror candor cases, in post-trial hearings. Providing this discretion
to the trial court will guard against results that mar the appearance of
justice, such as the court’s decision in Funk, as well as promote judicial
231
integrity by reducing the amount of overturned lower court decisions.
By requiring appellate courts to consult with trial court judges regarding
their impressions of jurors before upsetting the trial court’s ruling,

226. State v. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶ 82, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421 (Bradley, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the majority's approach seemed to take a step back from the existing
case law). In particular, Justice Bradley stated:
Here, the circuit court assessed the voir dire as a whole. It compared the factual
similarities between Tanya G.’s assaults and the facts of this case, evaluated her
nonresponsiveness, weighed her subsequent conflicting statements, and concluded,
“I must follow the law.” Ultimately it determined that a reasonable person in Tanya
G’s position could not be impartial. Rather than giving deference to those on the
front lines making these tough decisions, the majority turns back the clock. It
applies a long-discarded test which skews its analysis and leaves confusion in its
wake.
Id.
227. See Case, supra note 154, at 337 (“Without attention to the perception of the
fairness of the legal system, we risk disintegration and, ultimately, defiance.” (quoting Patrick
E. Longan, Civil Trial Reform and the Appearance of Fairness, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 295, 299
(1995))).
228. See Loewy, supra note 180, at 749–51.
229. See Case, supra note 154, at 337; McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood,
464 U.S. 548, 553 (1984) (describing the cost of trials to the parties, the jurors, and the
society).
230. See supra notes 190, 206.
231. Compare the majority opinion in Funk, 2011 WI 62, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d
421, with the dissent by Justice Abrahamson, id. ¶¶ 65–79 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting), and
with Justice Bradley’s dissent, id. ¶¶ 80–120 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
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Wisconsin courts would demonstrate respect for the complexities of bias
232
that align with understandings of human nature and judicial integrity.
Most importantly, the Transamerica rule would clearly demonstrate to
the public the court’s efforts at ensuring justice and would prevent ugly
perceptions that are created when appellate courts make judgment calls
233
based off of “the cold, typewritten words of an appellate record.”
KURT F. ELLISON

*

232. See supra Part VI.
233. State v. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481, 497, 579 N.W.2d 654, 660–61 (1998); see also State
v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 721, 596 N.W.2d 770, 780 (1999) (providing that the trial judge’s
determination as to juror’s objective bias is only overturned if as a matter of law a reasonable
judge could not have reached such a conclusion).
* Candidate for J.D., May 2013, Marquette University Law School; B.A., Univeristy of
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